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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 940700-CA
Priority No. 2

RICHARD RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Richard Rodriguez relies on his
opening brief and refers this Court to that brief for the
statements of jurisdiction, issues, case, facts, and summary of
the argument.

Appellant replies to the State's brief as follows.

Issues which are not addressed in this reply brief were
adequately analyzed in Appellant's opening brief or do not
require reply.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
EVIDENCE.
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
THE OFFICER HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION JUSTIFYING
THE DETENTION.
The State agrees that the trial judge correctly concluded
that the officers made a "level II" detention of Rodriguez.
State's brief at 8-9.
The State is correct that this Court must review the
totality of the circumstances in assessing whether the officer
had a reasonable articulable suspicion which justified the

detention.

See State's brief at 13.

test throughout his opening brief.
opening brief at 13, 15, 16-18.

Rodriguez recognizes this

See, e.g., Appellant's

By assessing the various factors

which the trial court could have considered, Rodriguez pointed
out that none of the factors supported a reasonable suspicion
determination and that under the totality of circumstances, the
officers did not have a reasonable suspicion to justify the
detention.

Appellant's opening brief at 13-18.

In arguing that the officer had a reasonable suspicion to
justify the detention of Rodriguez, the State relies on the
production of a wad of bills as the crucial distinguishing factor
which, under the totality of circumstances, tips the balance in
favor of a reasonable suspicion.

See State's brief at 20-22.

A

review of various cases involving detentions based on
transactions or encounters in high drug areas demonstrates that a
crucial factor for many courts appears to be whether the officer
witnessed the actual exchange of money and drugs and not whether
the officer observed money.

See, e.g.. People v. Shaw, 596

N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (cited by the State on
page 23 of its brief) (officer witnessed exchange of object for
cash in four separate transactions before detaining defendant);
Com, v. Albino, 652 A.2d 953 (Pa. Super. 1995), rev'd, 664 A.2d
84 (Pa. 1995) x (cited by the State on page 23 of its brief)
1

In its brief at 23, the State relies on the lower court
decision in Albino. This decision was reversed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in Com. v. Albino, 664 A.2d 84 (Pa. 1995)
("Albino II"). Hence, the facts in Albino were not sufficient to
establish a reasonable suspicion despite the exchange. Albino II
2

(officer observed defendant hand objects to unknown female in
exchange for cash).
In the present case, Officer Dailey testified that he saw
the individual in the tennis outfit pull out what the officer
felt was a wad of money.

The man then returned the money to his

own pocket without giving it to Rodriguez.
give the man anything.

Rodriguez did not

Hence, there was no exchange of money for

something in this case, and the money which the officer observed
was held by the other man.
The facts in this case are similar to the facts in Gipson
v. State, 537 So.2d 1081 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 1989) where the
officers did not see the exchange of drugs or money.

See also

State v. Ellington, 495 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Neb. 1993) (Ellington
cites numerous cases for proposition that various "jurisdictions
have collectively concluded that when an officer does not
recognize or know an individual; is not acting on particularized
information from a third party; does not observe an exchange of
items or money between the individual and another person; does
not observe any movement, gestures, or attempts by the individual
to conceal or hide objects; does not observe the individual
repeatedly approach vehicles in a similar pattern of activity;
and does not suspect the individual of any other crime, the
officer's mere observation of a pedestrian leaning into a window
of a stopped vehicle in a high-crime area and then walking away
upon seeing the officer does not amount to a reasonable suspicion
supports Rodriguez's argument.
3

of drug related activity warranting an investigatory stop").
In Johnson v. State, 610 So.2d 581 (Fla. App. 1 Dist.
1992), the court held that the officers did not have a reasonable
suspicion to justify a level two detention in circumstances
similar to those in the present case.

In Johnson, the officer

observed the defendant in a high drug area talking to another
individual on a bike.
officer, he rode away.

When the individual on the bike saw the
The officer observed what appeared to be

cash in one of the defendant's hands.

The officer also observed

an object in the defendant's other hand.

The defendant placed

that object in his pocket.
The court determined that the officer did not have a
reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant because, among other
things, the officer did not observe an exchange between the two
individuals even though the officer had observed cash in the
defendant's hand.

The court indicated that the following factors

did not support a reasonable suspicion:

(1) "the flight of the

unidentified bicyclist from an approaching officer, even in a
crime area, does not itself give rise to a founded suspicion of
criminal activity and does not justify a detention [citation
omitted], especially where the person is detained as the result
of a companion's flight.

[citation omitted]"; (2) "a quick

movement to conceal something is a legally insufficient reason to
justify an investigatory stop"; (3) knowing that the defendant
had a prior drug problem "did not raise a mere hunch to the level
of founded suspicion"; and (4) "simply having cash in his hand
4

did not create a founded suspicion of criminal activity
sufficient to warrant detention, as the officer observed no
exchange of drugs, money, or anything else.
omitted].11

[citations

Johnson, 610 So.2d at 583-84 (emphasis added).

The totality of the circumstances in the present case
provide a less compelling basis for detention than did the facts
in Johnson.

The officer in this case did not testify that he had

knowledge that Rodriguez had a drug problem or was a drug dealer.
He saw only what appeared to be cash; he did not see any other
object in Rodriguez's hand or that of the other individual.

The

other individual, not Rodriguez, had the cash which the officer
observed.

A comparison of the facts in this case with those in

Johnson further demonstrates that the officer lacked a "founded
suspicion" in this case.

The holding in Johnson directly

contradicts the State's position that the "crucial, additional
fact justifying Officer Dailey's reasonable suspicion" was "the
observation of the other man's producing a wad of bills,
following a verbal exchange with defendant at close range."
State's brief at 21.
This court's opinion in State v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825
(Utah App. 1992), provides further guidance.

In Sykes, this

Court held that the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to
justify a detention where he observed Sykes enter a house which
was under surveillance for drug activity and leave three minutes
later.

The officer was conducting surveillance on the house

because neighbors had complained about frequent and extensive
5

traffic and suspicious activities, a confidential informant had
provided information and the officer had made undercover drug
purchases in the area.

Although the officer had significant

information about apparent drug transactions at the house, he did
not have specific information creating a reasonable suspicion
that Sykes had made a drug purchase.

In the present case,

Officer Dailey had less information than that which the officer
in Sykes had.

Dailey had no information about Rodriguez as a

drug dealer or user.

As was the situation in Sykes, the officer

in this case did not have a reasonable articulable basis to
detain the defendant.
Cases cited by the State in which an appellate court held
that an officer had a reasonable suspicion to justify a detention
after witnessing an encounter in a high drug area contain
circumstances in addition to those which exist in this case.

For

example, in Thornton v. State, 559 So.2d 438, 439 (Fla. App. 1
Dist. 1990) (relied on by the State on pages 20-21 of its brief),
in a high drug area the officer saw an individual peer "into
appellant's hand which was 'outstretched in a cupped fashion.'"
Thornton, 559 So.2d at 439.

When Thornton saw the officer, he

made a quick move and turned his back to the officer.
officer thought Thorton was secreting a weapon.

The

The officer drew

his weapon and asked Thornton to remove his hands.

As Thornton

removed his hands, a baggie containing cocaine fell to the
ground.

The court clarified that the circumstances in Thornton

were distinguishable from those in Gipson because of "the
6

additional fact that when Officer Brown approached, appellant
turned quickly and placed his hands in his groin area, a furtive,
suspicious and potentially dangerous act" (emphasis added).
Thornton, 559 So,2d at 439.

Hence, a reasonable suspicion

existed that Thornton was armed and dangerous, thereby justifying
the officer's actions.
In the present case, Rodriguez did not put anything in
his pocket and there is no evidence that he did anything which
suggested that he was armed and dangerous.

While the officer did

see the other man put the money back in his pocket, this action
did not suggest that either party was armed and did not relate to
Rodriguez.

The actions taken by the officer in Thornton and the

basis for those actions are distinct from the circumstances of
this case.
State v. Doleman, 1995 WL 339184 (Del. Super. April 21,
1995) (cited by the State on page 21 of its brief) is
distinguishable from the present case.

The officer in Doleman

observed the defendant and another man leaning into a stopped
vehicle.

When the two men saw the officer, they immediately

walked away.

The car drove away.

The officer followed the pair

around the block and observed the two men again leaning into the
same car.

When the men saw the officer, one of them again

attempted to "surreptitiously withdraw between two houses."
at 1.

Id.

The officer did not call for backup or detain Doleman

until after he had observed Doleman and the other man depart when
they saw the officer, then again make contact with the same
7

vehicle.

Such recurring contact did not occur in this case.
People v. Shaw, 596 N.Y.S.2d 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)

(cited by the State on page 23 of its brief) is also
distinguishable from the present case.

In Shaw, the officer

observed the defendant engage in four different transactions in a
high drug area.

The officer saw the defendant reach into a bag

and deliver objects from the bag to others in exchange for cash.
Each transaction took about thirty seconds.
when officers approached.

The last buyer fled

In the present case, the officer

observed only one encounter and did not observe an exchancre of an
object for cash.
Officer Dailey had no information that Rodriguez was
involved with drugs.

Dailey witnessed a single transaction in

which no exchange of objects and money was made.

Under the

totality of the circumstances in this case, the officer did not
have a reasonable suspicion justifying the detention.2

2

The State attempts to create a lesser standard for
reasonable suspicion than that which is repeatedly espoused in case
law by taking a statement in State v. Menke, 787 P. 2d 537, 541
(Utah App. 1990), out of context. See State's brief at 12. The
correct analysis to be applied in determining whether an officer
had a reasonable suspicion justifying a detention is whether the
officer had "a reasonable suspicion to believe [the individual] has
committed or is in the act of committing a public offense." State
v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107 (UtahApp. 1994); State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d
825 (UtahApp. 1992), citing State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18
(Utah 1987) ("a police officer may detain an individual if he or
she has an articulable suspicion that criminal activity has
occurred or is occurring"). Menke also utilizes this test. See
Menke, 787 P.2d at 541. In State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah
App. 1991), this Court cites Menke, 787 P.2d at 541, for the
proposition that "a level two stop requires a 'reasonable
articulable suspicion' that defendant has committed or is about to
commit a crime" (emphasis added).
8

B. THE CLAIMED CONSENT WAS NOT ATTENUATED FROM
THE ILLEGAL DETENTION.
Officer Dailey testified that he detained Rodriguez and
the other man.

R. 116.

Another officer pulled up shortly

thereafter, and the two officers talked with the pair.

Dailey

explained to Rodriguez what he had observed and what he "felt
could be going on."

R. 116.

He told Rodriguez and the other man

"that we were having a terrible problem with drug activity in the
area and that I felt there was a drug transaction going on and
that we were waiting for another officer to arrive."

According

to Officer Dailey, both men responded that they could be
searched.

R. 116.

Rodriguez agreed, however, only to a search

of the person and not a search of the bike.

R. 128.

Hence, the

search of the bike exceeded the scope of any consent claimed by
the State, and the search of the bike cannot be upheld based on a
claim of consent.

See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 692 (Utah

1990) .
The State argues that " [b]ecause there was never an
official request for consent to search, defendant cannot credibly
argue that law enforcement exploited his alleged illegal
detention."

State's brief at 29.

The

State appears to rely on

United States v. McCoy, 839 F.Supp. 1442 (D. Or. 1993), and
Arroyo for this proposition.

State's brief at 28.

Neither case

holds or otherwise indicates in dictum that in the absence of an
official request to search, the exploitation analysis does not
apply.

Indeed, both cases demonstrate that the exploitation

analysis applies regardless of whether a defendant voluntarily
9

consents to a search because of the taint caused by the prior
illegality.

The State does not cite any other cases which

support this novel argument that the attenuation analysis
required by Arroyo and Thurman does not apply where the officer
does not make an express request for consent to search.
Under the circumstances of the present case, the request
to search was implicit.

As the Utah Supreme Court recently

recognized in State v. Hodson, No. 940053 (Utah November 30,
1995), in some circumstances "[i]mplicit threats are as real as
express verbal threats."

Hodson, slip op. at 4.

Implicit

requests can also be as real as express requests, particularly in
a situation such as the instant one where the officer had made it
clear that he believed a drug transaction was occurring and that
he intended to hold Rodriguez.

If this Court were to adopt the

State's rigid requirement that an express request is required in
order to trigger the exploitation analysis, it would open the
door to abusive police practices.

Under such a rule, searches

would be upheld where officers illegally detained individuals and
implied that they would like to search, but refrained from saying
the magic words.
The State's analysis appears to equate the voluntariness
prong of the consent inquiry with the exploitation inquiry.
State's brief at 27- 29.

It is clear, however, that the two

prongs present two distinct inquiries.

Where a defendant

voluntarily consents to a search, the evidence seized in the
search may nevertheless be suppressed where the officers
10

See

exploited the primary illegality.

See State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d

1256 (Utah 1993).
The exploitation analysis is required after police
illegally detain an individual because of the concern that
subsequently obtained evidence is tainted by the illegal police
activity.

In United States v. McCoy, 839 F. Supp. 1442 (D. Or.

1993) (cited by the State on page 28 of its brief), the court
stated:
When consent to search is elicited and given
following an illegal arrest, the consent to
search is the result of the "chain of presumptive
coercion." Because the illegal arrest triggers
the exclusionary rule, the consent is tainted as
part of the fruit of the poisonous tree," and the
government must show that sufficient attenuation
has occurred to free the consent from the taint.
[citations omitted].
McCoy, 839 F.Supp. at 1445.

Hence, the exploitation analysis is

required regardless of whether officers expressly requested
consent to search.
In making its attenuation argument, the State disregards
two of the three prongs of the attenuation analysis.

While the

State acknowledges in passing that the factors to be considered
include the "'temporal proximity' of the illegality" and the
"presence of intervening circumstances," it makes no factual
analysis of these two factors.

The State's failure to analyze

two of the three Thurman/Arroyo exploitation factors is most
likely due to the fact that both of those factors weigh heavily
in favor of suppression.

Indeed, the illegality occurred in

extremely close temporal proximity to the alleged consent and no
11

intervening factors occurred.
The State appears to be arguing that the purpose and
flagrancy factor is the only factor which should be considered in
determining whether the officers exploited the illegality.
State's brief at 24-34.
Thurman and Arroyo.

This is clearly not the case pursuant to

While the purpose and flagrancy factor is

important, the lack of purposeful or flagrant police conduct does
not end the inquiry.

Indeed, Thurman suggests that while

flagrant police conduct may weigh so heavily that the evidence
must be suppressed regardless of temporal proximity of the
illegality or the existence of intervening factors, it does not
suggest the opposite--that the lack of flagrant police conduct
ends the inquiry.

Indeed, Thurman makes it clear that the

temporal proximity and lack of intervening circumstances must be
considered.

In this case, the State has not established that

intervening factors or the passage of time exist and attenuated
the prior illegality from the claimed consent.
The State argues that Officer Dailey's behavior was
neither negligent nor intentional and therefore it was not
flagrant.

As Rodriguez argued in his opening brief at 20-21, the

officer's conduct was purposeful and intentional.

He

acknowledged that he seized Rodriguez based on a hunch, even
though case law makes it clear that individuals cannot be
detained where an officer has a hunch rather than an articulable
suspicion.

The purpose of the detention was apparently to search

for drugs.

The officer's conduct therefore fits within the
12

purpose and flagrancy requirement.

See Thurman, 846 P.2d at

1264.
The State's argument that the officer's actions were
neither purposeful nor negligent misconstrues the meaning of
those terms.

An officer does not need malicious intent or actual

knowledge that his behavior is unconstitutional in order to act
in a purposeful or flagrant manner.

Instead, actions aimed at

obtaining a consent to search where the initial detention was
illegal fall within this prong.

In this case, where the officer

acknowledged that he was acting on a hunch, the facts support
that acknowledgement, and the purpose of the detention appears to
be an attempt to search the individuals for drugs, the officer's
actions were purposeful and flagrant.
Pursuant to the State's argument in this case, any
mistake by officers as to whether they were conducting a legal
search would result in the search being upheld.

Such a rule

would completely eviscerate the important role played by the
exploitation analysis in these cases.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Rodriguez respectfully
requests that his convictions be reversed and the case remanded
to the trial court for a new trial or dismissal.

13
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